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ABSTRACT
Attacks targeting software on embedded systems are becom-
ing increasingly prevalent. Remote attestation is a mech-
anism that allows establishing trust in embedded devices.
However, existing attestation schemes are either static and
cannot detect control-flow attacks, or require instrumenta-
tion of software incurring high performance overheads. To
overcome these limitations, we present LO-FAT, the first
practical hardware-based approach to control-flow attesta-
tion. By leveraging existing processor hardware features
and commonly-used IP blocks, our approach enables efficient
control-flow attestation without requiring software instru-
mentation. We show that our proof-of-concept implementa-
tion based on a RISC-V SoC incurs no processor stalls and
requires reasonable area overhead.
1 Introduction
Embedded systems have been facing a variety of security
challenges for decades [25] which are becoming increasingly
prevalent with emerging trends such as collaborative Inter-
net of Things (IoT). A recent prominent example is Mirai
malware1 in October 2016, where a series of Distributed
Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks against the DNS system
disrupted a number of prominent websites.These attacks were
perpetrated by IoT devices, including routers, DVRs, and
web-enabled security cameras, that had been compromised
by the Mirai malware.
Increasingly, attacks against embedded systems aim to ex-
ploit software vulnerabilities. In 2015, a remotely exploitable
buffer overflow vulnerability was found in the USB over IP
software used in millions of residential gateways and wireless
routers supplied by prominent manufacturers2. In 2014, a
memory corruption flaw was found in the embedded web-
server software used by over 200 different models of embedded
devices, affecting at least 12 million devices, many of which
still remain vulnerable today3.
1https://www.incapsula.com/blog/
malware-analysis-mirai-ddos-botnet.html
2http://blog.sec-consult.com/2015/05/
kcodes-netusb-how-small-taiwanese.html
3http://mis.fortunecook.ie/
Remote attestation is an important class of security mech-
anisms designed to detect software attacks. In principle,
remote attestation allows one entity (the verifier) to ascer-
tain the precise state of the software running on a remote
system (the prover). However, most attestation schemes are
static in that they attest the software initially loaded by the
prover before it begins executing. Although useful, this still
leaves the system vulnerable to run-time software attacks. If
the adversary gains control of the stack or heap, (s)he can al-
ter control-flow information to subvert the control flow of the
target program, and mount a code-reuse attack. Similarly, in
non-control data attacks [8], the adversary modifies strategic
data variables to cause a permissible but unintended control
flow change (e.g., executing a privileged instruction sequence).
Traditionally, code-reuse attacks are mitigated using tech-
niques such as control-flow integrity (CFI) [1]. However,
CFI cannot prevent non-control data attacks, since these do
not violate control-flow integrity. Neither of these types of
attacks can be detected by static attestation.
To overcome these challenges control-flow attestation [2]
was proposed very recently, enabling the prover to precisely
report the control flow of application software to the ver-
ifier while giving assurance on control-flow integrity and
detection of non-control data attacks. The attestation mech-
anism of [2] requires an isolated execution environment (e.g.,
ARM TrustZone, Intel SGX) to protect it against potentially
compromised application software. However, implement-
ing control-flow attestation in software has two limitations:
Firstly, in order to detect control-flow events, the application
software must be instrumented prior to deployment. Non-
instrumented or incorrectly-instrumented software cannot
be attested. The instrumentation rewrites all control-flow
instructions (e.g., branch, return, etc.) in order to transfer
control to the attestation software. Secondly, the attestation
software runs on the main processor which incurs significant
performance penalties because single control-flow instructions
are essentially replaced with relatively many numbers of in-
structions in order to track and record the control-flow event
(e.g., update a running hash value). As we elaborate in §7,
some existing hardware approaches, such as debugging and
tracing features in modern processors [24, 14] or hardware
security architectures [6, 3, 9], can be used to record control
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flow information. However, due to the overhead they incur
or the type of information they record, these approaches are
not well-suited for control-flow attestation.
Goals and Contributions. To overcome the limitations
of a software solution, we introduce a practical hardware-
based Low-Overhead Control Flow ATtestation architecture,
LO-FAT. Unlike software implementations, LO-FAT can han-
dle unmodified application software without instrumentation,
meaning that it is transparent to legacy software. By record-
ing the control flow in hardware in parallel to the main
processor, LO-FAT does not stall the application software,
thus eliminating the performance overhead of attestation in
software. LO-FAT leverages existing processor features and
commonly-used IP blocks and can feasibly be implemented
on typical embedded systems hardware platforms.
The main contributions of this paper are:
• Design of LO-FAT, a hardware-based scheme for control-
flow attestation, providing the same security guarantees
as previous software schemes, without the performance
overhead or the need for software instrumentation (§4).
• An integrated optimization for eliminating redundant
attestation computation (e.g., avoiding duplication
when attesting loops) and reducing the burden on the
verifier (§4).
• A proof-of-concept implementation of LO-FAT on the
new open-source RISC-V architecture targeting the
Pulpino core for single-threaded embedded system soft-
ware (§5).
• A systematic evaluation of LO-FAT in terms of the
required hardware area and performance benefits (§6).
2 Problem Setting and Challenges
Remote attestation provides a well-known mechanism for
detecting malware on a device. However, existing conven-
tional (binary) attestation cannot detect run-time exploita-
tion techniques, since run-time attacks do not not modify the
program binary. Such attacks aim to subvert the intended
control flow of the targeted program while it is executing.
An overview of different classes of such attacks is shown in
Figure 1. In general, a program reserves dedicated memo-
ries for data and code. The former is marked as readable
and writable (rw), whereas the latter is as readable and
executable (rx). This ensures that code cannot be executed
from data memory, and code memory cannot be overwritten.
Furthermore, any program can be abstracted through its
corresponding control-flow graph (CFG) that encapsulates
the valid paths a program should follow at run-time.
Adversary
DATA (rw)
CODE (rx)
Loop Counters
Data Variables
indirectly affecting 
control flow
Code Pointers
Program Memory
Control-Flow 
Graph (CFG)1
2
3
Figure 1: Overview on run-time attack classes
We can distinguish three classes of run-time attacks: ¶
non-control-data attacks that indirectly affect the control
flow of a program, · corruption of loop counter variables,
idS , i, CFG(S)
Verifier V Prover P
S , I
idS , i , N
R ← sign(P ||N ; sk)
A = hash
(
[Src0,Dest0], · · · , [Srcn,Destn]
)
L = loops metadata
P = (A,L)← exec(S(i , I )), where:
P , R
(⊥,>)← versig(R; pk)
(⊥,>)← ver(P ,CFG(S)|i )
Figure 2: Attestation protocol of LO-FAT
and ¸ code-pointer overwrites. The most prominent run-
time attacks exploit code-pointer overwrites, i.e., corruption
of return addresses and function pointers. For instance,
code-reuse attacks such as Return-oriented Programming
(ROP) [23] exploit memory corruption vulnerabilities (e.g.,
buffer overflows) in the program and then stitch together a
malicious sequence of machine code instructions from benign
gadgets of code already residing in the vulnerable program
memory. This is exemplified by a malicious CFG edge (see
dashed line for code-pointer overwrite in Figure 1). These
attacks have been shown to be a realistic threat on many
processor architectures, such as Intel x86 [23], ARM [17]
and embedded systems building on Atmel AVR [12]. Al-
though countermeasures against this class of attacks exist,
e.g., control-flow Integrity (CFI) [1] and code-pointer in-
tegrity (CPI) [16], they do not prevent attacks ¶ and ·. The
so-called non-control data attacks [8] do not compromise the
control flow of a program, but cause unexpected malicious
control-flow paths by corrupting data variables. In ¶, the
attacker compromises data variables that are used for secu-
rity decisions during program execution, e.g., corrupting an
authentication variable to execute a privileged but existing
path. Attack class · is even more subtle as it only affects
the number of times a program loop is executed. This can
have severe consequences in the context of embedded system
software, e.g., a syringe pump dispenses more liquid than
requested (see [2]).
Control-flow attestation can cover these cases by assuring
the verifier of the precise run-time control flow of the pro-
gram on the embedded device. In [2], the first control-flow
attestation scheme was proposed and implemented. However,
it suffers from practical limitations, such as high performance
overhead and the need for tedious software instrumentation.
Our work tackles the challenge of detecting attack classes
¶- ¸, while addressing the limitations of recently proposed
software-based control-flow attestation [2] by presenting LO-
FAT, an efficient hardware-only solution.
3 System Model
Figure 2 depicts the attestation protocol of LO-FAT: the
verifier V aims to attest the run-time control-flow (execution
path) of the Program S on a remote embedded system – the
prover P. We assume that both V and P have access to
the program S in binary form and that conventional static
(binary) attestation assures P is executing the correct and
unmodified program S.
First, V performs a one-time offline pre-processing step to
generate the CFG of S (including expected loop execution
information) by means of static or dynamic analysis. Next,
V initiates the protocol by sending P the program input i
for the program ID idS , and the nonce N to ensure freshness
of the attestation response. P executes S with verifier input
i and a set of malicious adversary inputs I. In fact, the
untrusted inputs received may corrupt the control-flow by
means of the attack techniques described in §2. While S
executes, LO-FAT captures the control-flow transitions and
generates a cumulative authenticator A of the control-flow
path taking source and destination address (Src,Dest) of
each branch as input. Naively storing and transmitting every
single executed instruction to V would incur impractical
memory, power and communication overheads, especially
for resource-constrained embedded devices. Hence, LO-FAT
follows the idea outlined in [2] and computes a cumulative
cryptographic hash of the executed path. In addition, it also
produces auxiliary metadata L to track program loop paths
and their number of iterations (including recursive functions)
thereby covering attacks of class · in Figure 1. Together A
and L form a unique program path P . Lastly, upon program
exit, P generates the attestation report R = sign(P ||N ; sk),
under the signing key sk , which is stored by P in hardware-
protected secure memory, e.g., a register that is accessible
only to LO-FAT. Upon receiving R, V verifies the signature
using the verification key pk. Next, V checks whether the
reported path P resembles a valid path in CFG under input
i. If true, V is assured of P’s execution.
Adversary Model and Assumptions. We assume a
strong adversary that has full control over the data memory of
P and can utilize standard memory corruption vulnerabilities
to modify arbitrary writable memory locations. However, the
adversary cannot modify program code at run-time (marked
as rx ) and cannot modify memory used by LO-FAT itself (due
to hardware protection). Note that similar to all attestation
schemes we consider software-only attacks and hence physical
attacks on P’s device are out of scope in this work. Also note
that our scheme can detect attacks that affect the program’s
control-flow, but not pure data-driven attacks (that do not
affect any control-flow) such as data-oriented programming
attacks, which remain an open research problem [13].
4 LO-FAT Design
Figure 3 illustrates our architecture for LO-FAT and how it
interfaces with the processor pipeline. The proposed scheme
exploits branch tracking functionality inherent in any proces-
sor pipeline and re-usable IP cores such as the hash engine.
We extend these with additional logic to achieve efficient
tracing of control-flow information. The main LO-FAT com-
ponents are the branch filter and the loop monitor. The
former extracts branch instructions from the processor as it
executes the attested code segment while the latter monitors
program loops.
Branch Filter. Upon code execution, the branch filter,
which is tightly coupled to the processor, extracts the current
program counter and instruction executed per clock cycle.
Then it filters in every branch, jump and return instruction
since these are the relevant instructions for control-flow at-
testation. The branch filter outputs a concise representation
of every executed branch instruction with its source and des-
tination address pair (Src,Dest) into a dedicated branches
memory and detects whether the intercepted branch is within
a program loop. If not, the branch filter enables hashing of
(Src,Dest). Branches inside a program loop require special
H
as
h
 
e
n
gi
n
e
 
co
n
tr
o
lle
r
Branches memory
Hash 
engine
addi    sp,sp,-16
sw      ra,12(sp)
jalr    zero,ra,0 
lw      ra,12(sp)
addi    sp,sp,16
Code
executed instructions
lo
o
p
s_
st
a
tu
s 
 &
 b
ra
n
ch
_
st
a
tu
s 
ct
rl
branch type, (Src, Dest)
loop_end ctrl
non_loops ctrl
M
e
ta
d
at
a 
ge
n
e
ra
to
rLoop P_IDs & counters
Loop counter memory
Indirect calls: (Src, Dest)
Loop P_IDs
Legend:
Pre-existing
components
LO-FAT
components
On-chip memory
pipelined processor
Hash A
new_path ctrl
1
3
4
2
5
6
7
8
11
Metadata 
storage
Loop Monitor
Branch Filter
3
Metadata 
L
10
9
Figure 3: Architecture of LO-FAT.
treatment in LO-FAT, because (i) loop counter manipulation
may compromise the program’s control-flow in a malicious
way (§2), and (ii) naively hashing each loop iteration and
path leads to a combinatorial explosion of valid hash val-
ues [2]. As such, we design LO-FAT to compress control-flow
information associated with loops efficiently. As mentioned
earlier in §3, we report each loop path and its number of
iterations as auxiliary metadata L. However, doing so in
hardware is challenging, i.e., in contrast to the most related
work C-FLAT, since we do not use code instrumentation to
preserve legacy compliance. Hence, the branch filter must
detect and identify loop entry and exit points and their depth
at run-time without instrumentation aid. We describe in §5.1
how we tackled this challenge.
Loop Monitor. When a loop is encountered, the branch
filter forwards the loop entry and exit to the loop monitor.
The loop monitor identifies and tracks program loops (in-
cluding nested loops). When a branch inside a program loop
is encountered, the branch filter forwards this information to
the loop monitor which in turn encodes each path inside the
loop uniquely. Simultaneously, (Src,Dest) of each branch
remains stored in the branches memory.
Another major challenge concerning loops is the hash
computation and attestation overhead incurred by hashing
each loop iteration. In LO-FAT, we significantly reduce
the hash computation cost by only hashing each loop path
once and keeping an iteration counter for each unique loop
path. To achieve this, LO-FAT generates a unique path
encoding for each loop path and associates an on-chip loop
counter with it. The loop monitor indicates newly observed
loop paths to the hash engine controller in order to hash its
corresponding (Src,Dest) from the branches memory. On the
other hand, once the same loop path executes, LO-FAT only
needs to increment the counter, i.e., not requiring further
hash operations.
Upon loop exit, the loop monitor requests the metadata
generator to assemble the loop auxiliary metadata based
on the loops memory which contains the unique loop path
encodings, their number of iterations, and indirect branch
targets. This information is stored on-chip and is appended
to the final hash value A computed at the end of the attested
execution. Finally, a digital signature R is computed over
the hash value A, metadata L and nonce N and sent to V
for attestation (as per our protocol outlined in §3).
5 Implementation
5.1 Loop Handling
Detecting loops. As shown in Figure 3, the branch filter
unit traces the instruction (and its address) executed per
clock cycle and filters in 1© every branch, jump and return
instruction. It outputs a concise representation of every
executed branch instruction with its (Src,Dest)-pair into
a dedicated branch buffer ( 2©). To compress the control-
flow trace for loops, the branch filter has to detect loops.
If the intercepted branch is not in a loop, the branch filter
sends the control signal non loops ctrl to the existing hash
engine controller to compute a hash over (Src,Dest) in 3©.
Otherwise, the branch filter forwards the loop status (entry
and exit) to the loop monitor and its depth (in case of nested
loops) via the loops status ctrl signals ( 4©).
To enable efficient run-time loop detection, we utilize a
property of RISC architectures that implement a link-register,
such as PowerPC, ARM, SPARC, and RISC-V. LO-FAT uses
a simple heuristic to differentiate between backward branches
that constitute loops, and branches for subroutine calls where
the call target resides earlier in memory. Since subroutine
calls use instructions that update the link-register, we con-
sider the target of each non-linking backwards branch as
a loop entry node. The basic block proceeding the branch
instruction is considered a loop exit node. We base our heuris-
tic on our observations of the RISC-V compiler assembly and
the calling convention described in the instruction manual:
any subroutine call with multiple call sites must be linking
and updates the link-register. Subroutines with a single call
site are still compiled as a linking branch or are optimized
by traditional inlining using the RISC-V compiler.
The addresses of the entry and exit nodes of each loop
are stored in registers by the loop detector and used to de-
tect and track loop iterations and loop depth at run-time
when executing nested loops. The number of loop iterations
is determined by recording the number of times the loop
entry node is entered within the loop. Loop termination is
detected by tracking if execution proceeds to or past the
currently active loop exit node, either as the result of sequen-
tial execution (e.g. in the case of a conditional branch) or
a non-linking branch (e.g. break). Loop execution status
is forwarded using the loops status ctrl signals to the loop
monitor, as shown in Figure 3.
Tracking loops. As shown in Figure 3, the loop monitor
receives branch status ctrl signals from the branch filter to
describe the type of intercepted branch instruction and its
(Src,Dest) ( 5©). This branch tracking mechanism allows
the loop path encoder to uniquely encode paths as they
occur. Simultaneously, (Src,Dest) of each branch along the
executing loop path remain stored in the branches memory.
Figure 4 shows a sample pseudo-code and its CFG ac-
cording to how the instructions would be laid out in code
memory to illustrate how the loop monitor encodes the loop
paths. The example code shows a while-loop with an if-
else statement inside. Each basic block in the pseudo-code
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Figure 4: CFG for pseudo-code and its layout of
instructions in memory.
is represented by a node in the CFG and numbered ac-
cordingly, with loop entry and exit nodes also indicated.
Within this simple loop, there are only 2 valid paths: bold
path N2 → N3 → N4 → N6 → N2 and dashed path
N2 → N3 → N5 → N6 → N2.
For every conditional branch, the processor evaluates
the condition and either jumps to the computed target ad-
dress (branch is taken), or continues sequentially to the
next instruction address in memory (branch is not taken).
Processors commonly track this branching behavior in the
pipeline and may encode a taken/not-taken branch with
’1’/’0’. This branch information is extracted from the pro-
cessor by the branch filter and used by the loop monitor to
uniquely identify and encode paths within each loop with
a unique path ID, as shown in Figure 4. In Figure 4, the
dashed path N2 → N3 → N5 → N6 → N2 is encoded as ‘011’
and bold path N2 → N3 → N4 → N6 → N2 as ‘0011’. Other
path encodings are considered invalid and detected by the V.
Once a loop path is completed, this unique path ID is
used to index loop counter memory, in which the number
of iterations for each corresponding path is saved ( 6©) in
Figure 3. A counter value of zero indicates the first time a
particular path is executed. This is forwarded by the loop
monitor into the hash engine controller using new path ctrl
signals ( 7©) to enable hashing of corresponding (Src,Dest)
pairs. Otherwise, the counter is simply incremented.
To ensure constant-time, single-cycle memory access la-
tency, we implement loop counter memory as on-chip memory
indexed by the unique loop path encodings. However, this
consumes a dedicated sparsely-utilized memory which is of-
ten a constrained resource on low-end embedded devices.
In light of this, LO-FAT allows configuring the granularity
of the control-flow tracking according to the availability of
memory resources.
Once a loop exits, this is identified by the loop monitor and
indicated in the loop end ctrl signals sent to the metadata
generator ( 8©). The metadata generator assembles the loop
auxiliary metadata from the loops memory - this consists of
the unique loop path encodings in order of first occurrence,
the number of iterations of each path, and the indirect branch
targets encountered in this loop ( 9©). This fine-grained
auxiliary information on loop execution is stored on-chip
(10©) and is appended to the final hash value computed at
the end of the attested execution (11©). Finally, a digital
signature is computed over the hash value, metadata and
nonce N , and sent to V for attestation. Handling indirect
branches in loops is yet another implementation challenge
we discuss next.
5.2 Handling Indirect Branches in Loops
Indirect branches can involve any arbitrary number of targets
which can never be exhaustively identified using static anal-
ysis. To uniquely identify loop paths with indirect branches
(calls and returns), we would need to include the 32-bit tar-
get addresses into the path encodings, which would require
infeasibly high memory requirements for loop path-indexed
memory. Instead, we re-encode the addresses using a smaller
number of n bits, allowing a maximum number of 2n-1 pos-
sible targets for each loop. Target addresses are encoded at
run-time and stored in a register file, which is implemented
as 2 interleaved CAMs to ensure low-latency constant-time
access. When a target address is encountered that exceeds
the configured limit, we report this in the encoding to the V
by an all-zero code. LO-FAT is designed such that the maxi-
mum number of branches per loop path and the maximum
number of possible target addresses (of indirect branches)
to track is configurable in a trade-off between granularity
and availability of on-chip memory. Tracking ` branches per
path in a loop requires 8 × 2` bits memory. In our imple-
mentation, we configure n = 4 to track up to 16 possible
indirect branch targets for a given loop and ` = 16 such that
LO-FAT can handle a maximum of 16 branches per loop
path (every additional indirect branch tracked reduces the
maximum number of possible conditional branches by n) and
depth of up to 3 nested loops, which requires a dedicated 1.5
Mbits memory that is synthesized as block RAM (BRAM)
when prototyping on FPGA. Once a loop exists, its memory
is re-used for other subsequent loop executions.
Loop metadata. The measurement in A is a single hash
computation of (Src,Dest) pairs of executed loop paths. To
enable V to reconstruct the final hash value, metadata L
of the loops serves as helper data and provides V with fine-
grained insight into the execution of the loops. L contains the
encodings of executed paths in each loop, the order of first
occurrence of each executed path, and number of iterations
per loop path and indirect branch targets.
5.3 Hash Engine
A single hash measurement A is computed on the full ex-
ecution path, along with auxiliary loop metadata L. We
employ a SHA-3 512-bit open-source engine4 operating at
a maximum clock frequency of 150 MHz. It consists of a
permutation module which operates on a message block size
of 576-bit. User input is absorbed by the core first into a
padding module to assemble the 576-bit block size. Once this
padding is full, the permutation module begins computation
on input. In LO-FAT, the engine can absorb a 64-bit input
(Src,Dest)-pair every clock cycle into the padding module for
9 clock cycles, after which the 576-bit buffer becomes full and
notifies the permutation module to begin its computation.
Once full, the padding buffer cannot absorb further input for
3 clock cycles after which it resumes normally. Therefore, a
small cache buffer is configured at the hash engine input to
prevent dropping of (Src,Dest)-pairs if they arrive during
these cycles where the padding buffer is full. Using this
hash engine, an unlimited message size can be hashed while
indicating the end of streaming (Src,Dest)-pairs when the
execution of attested software is completed.
4http://opencores.org/project,sha3
6 Evaluation
We present a proof-of-concept implementation of LO-FAT on
Pulpino [18], the first open-source RISC-V-based microcon-
troller SoC [19]. It is based on a single 32-bit 4-stage minimal
RISC-V core targeting low-end embedded systems. We aug-
ment the RISC-V processor pipeline to interface with the
LO-FAT branch filter to extract control-flow signals required
for execution flow tracing. LO-FAT can be easily integrated
into any low-end embedded processor as it does not require
modifications to the ISA.
6.1 Functionality and Performance
We integrated LO-FAT with Pulpino and performed cycle-
accurate functional simulation of their RTL Verilog source
code on ModelSim while Pulpino executed extracted code
segments from real embedded applications, such as Open
Syringe Pump5, an open-source open-hardware syringe pump
design. Simulation results confirmed the functionality of LO-
FAT in correctly capturing and compressing the control flow
(branches, loops, and nested loops) of an uninstrumented
application. Since LO-FAT extracts and filters control-flow
events in parallel with the processor, it does not incur any
performance overhead for the attested software, as opposed
to C-FLAT which incurs attestation overhead that is linearly
dependent on the number of control-flow events. LO-FAT
internally incurs latency of 2 clock cycles for branch instruc-
tions and loop status tracking and 5 clock cycles at loop exit
for completing path ID generation and loop counter memory
access and update. However, LO-FAT simultaneously con-
tinues to absorb and process any incoming (Src,Dest)-pairs
to prevent the processor from stalling or dropping trace in-
formation. Synthesis results using Xilinx Vivado indicate
LO-FAT can operate at maximum clock frequency of 80 MHz
on a Virtex-7 XC7Z020 FPGA device on a Zedboard. The
LO-FAT units are engineered such that they operate on par
with Pulpino’s clock frequency, while also allowing single-
cycle constant-time memory accesses for indirect branches
and loops management. Eliminating the CAM access results
in a much higher clock frequency if desired.
The length of the auxiliary metadata (L) that must be sent
to V depends on the number of loops executed, the number
of different paths per loop, and the number of indirect branch
targets encountered in the attested code.
6.2 Area
On a Virtex-7 XC7Z020, LO-FAT consumes 4% of the avail-
able registers and 6% of available LUTs, which amounts to
an average of 20% additional logic overhead to the Pulpino
SoC. 49 36Kbit Block RAM (BRAMs) are utilized, most of
which are dedicated for the sparse loop path-indexed memo-
ries to ensure constant-time single-cycle access. Therefore,
its width depends on the configured maximum number of
indirect branches allowed in each loop path and number of
bits required to encode them, as discussed in §5.2. In our
implementation, the loop monitor is configured to tackle
up to 4 indirect branches and requires 10 bits to encode
them in Path ID, resulting in 16 BRAMs per loop. Since we
allow up to 3 levels of nested loops, we require 48 BRAMs.
Configuring these parameters to lower numbers reduces the
memory requirements significantly at the expense of coarser
granularity or additional logic overhead respectively. Alter-
natively, we are currently optimizing our implementation
5https://hackaday.io/project/1838-open-syringe-pump
and leveraging content-addressable memories (CAMs) for
these memories instead. This would remain to satisfy our
requirement for constant-time access while also reducing the
memory consumption significantly. However, implementing
parallel CAM search is logic consuming and must be opti-
mized such that it does not affect the maximum operating
clock frequency of the entire architecture.
6.3 Security
The primary security requirement of LO-FAT is to provide
an accurate, complete, authentic, and fresh attestation of
P’s control flow. This requires an integrity-protected mecha-
nism for recording control-flow information and unforgeably
communicating this to V.
Control-Flow Recording. One of the main contribu-
tions of LO-FAT is using low-overhead hardware extensions
to record control-flow information preventing it from being
modified or subverted by malicious software. The on-chip
memory employed by LO-FAT for storing the (Src,Dest) ad-
dresses prior to their hashing is also assumed to be protected
from adversarial access. The hardware extensions are guar-
anteed to receive every control-flow event from the processor,
thus ensuring that the complete control flow is recorded. All
(Src,Dest) addresses are cryptographically hashed resulting
in the authenticator A. The auxiliary metadata L records
(1) the unique paths within each loop; (2) the number of repe-
titions of each path; and (3) all indirect branches encountered
within loops.
Attestation Protocol. LO-FAT makes use of the widely-
used secure challenge-response attestation protocol. As ex-
plained in §3, P sends the recorded program path P along
with a digital signature over P and a nonce supplied by V.
If P’s signing key has not been compromised, this signature
guarantees the authenticity of the attestation, and the inclu-
sion of the challenge nonce ensures freshness. Our assumed
software adversary cannot compromise the signing key be-
cause it is stored in hardware-protected secure memory. Any
tampering with the attestation messages can be detected by
V.
Given that the control flow recording and the signing key
is protected from software attacks, the resulting attestation
report provided by LO-FAT is accurate, complete, authentic,
and fresh. Since P’s code is immutable and is statically
attested at boot time, V has complete information about
P’s execution. As described in §3, V also has access to the
CFG of the attested software, which it can use to identify
permissible control flows and detect control-flow attacks or
non-control data attacks.
7 Related Work
Remote Attestation. Most prior work focuses on static
remote attestation [21, 11, 7], which is orthogonal to run-
time attestation – the focus of this paper. Software-based
attestation [22] can, under strict assumptions, enable static
attestation of legacy devices without hardware-based trust
anchors. Property-based attestation [20] can attest behav-
ioral characteristics of a program, with the assistance of
a trusted third-party. However, none of these can attest
control-flow at machine code instruction level.
Prior work on run-time attestation focuses on specific as-
pects of a program’s execution. ReDAS [15] attests program
data invariants, such as the integrity of a function’s base
pointer, at each system call. Trusted virtual containers [4]
attest the run-time launch order of application modules –
a form of coarse-grained control-flow attestation that does
not include internal control flows within modules. Dyn-
IMA [10] uses dynamic taint analysis and tracing to attest
run-time properties that may be symptomatic of run-time
attacks. However, it does not cover non-control data attacks
and incurs high performance overhead due to dynamic taint
analysis.
C-FLAT [2] is a fine-grained control-flow attestation scheme.
LO-FAT also leverages the idea of attesting the control flow
of an application by computing a cumulative hash of ex-
ecuted branches but with several fundamental differences.
C-FLAT requires instrumentation of all control-flow instruc-
tions thereby violating legacy compliance. In contrast, LO-
FAT does not require any binary rewriting. C-FLAT re-
quires complete coverage in the offline binary analysis, as
un-instrumented control-flow instructions could be exploited
to mount undetectable attacks. This is not possible in LO-
FAT as every executed branch is monitored by design. Finally,
C-FLAT incurs significant performance overhead, whereas
LO-FAT incurs no performance overhead due to its efficient
hardware support for control-flow attestation.
Tracing and Debug Mechanisms. Intel processors
provide the Last Branch Record (LBR) and Branch Trace
Store (BTS) mechanisms, which can be used to trace control-
flow events [24]. However, the overhead incurred by these
debugging mechanisms makes them unsuitable for control-
flow attestation. Recently, Intel processors introduced Intel
Processor Trace (IPT) [14], a low-overhead execution tracing
feature that collects more tracing information than BTS
(including execution mode and timing information). However,
IPT cannot be directly used for control-flow attestation as
it only reports control-flow events that cannot be inferred
from static analysis. ARM’s CoreSight6 debug and trace
architecture provides a mechanism to access trace information
from different hardware trace components. However, high-
throughput tracing on ARM typically requires the use of
proprietary hardware.
Hardware-Assisted Security. Recent work [5, 26] de-
veloped a generic architecture for enforcing a diverse range
of SoC security policies. Each IP block has an individually-
customized security wrapper that sends security-relevant
events and information to a central security controller to
enforce individual security policies for each IP. However, this
incurs high memory and logic complexity overhead as the
number of IPs increases. It has further been proposed [6,
3] that this could be made more practical by re-purposing
design-for-debug features found on many SoCs – a promising
approach which could complement LO-FAT in future.
Sofia [9] is a recent hardware-assisted architecture for en-
forcing control-flow integrity (CFI). It encrypts instructions
with CFI-dependent data, such that they can only be de-
crypted at run-time as part of a valid control-flow path, and
it ensures instruction integrity by checking MACs on groups
of instructions at run-time. However, unlike LO-FAT, this
requires software instrumentation and places decryption in
the critical execution path, thus incurring total execution
time overheads of up to 110%.
6https://www.arm.com/products/system-ip/coresight-
debug-trace
8 Conclusion
Due to the increasing prevalence of interconnected embedded
systems, software running on these devices have become a
prime target for remote attacks. We presented in this paper
the first hardware-based control-flow attestation scheme that
allows precise detection of remote memory corruption attacks
in embedded system software. Our architecture, LO-FAT,
monitors, measures and reports the program’s behavior by
interfacing with the processor to intercept control-flow events.
LO-FAT does not require any code instrumentation (com-
pliant to legacy software), compiler toolchain or instruction
set extension. Our proof-of-concept implementation on the
open-source RISC-V core is highly efficient with no perfor-
mance impact on the attested software at the expense of
minimal logic overhead and on-chip memory.
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